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I. Introduction
In her recent blog article, Vishaka Ramesh claims that International Investment
Law is violated by Data Protection Principles around the world, supporting her
thesis in particular with rules set out by the General Data Protection Regulation
of the European Union (GDPR). In her opinion, principles like Data Minimization
and Localization are likely to infringe generally accepted principles of investment
law, such as the fair and equitable standard of treatment of aliens. While focusing
on these possible violations of International Investment Law by Data Protection
Law, she does not — in our opinion — sufficiently consider justifications of such
regulations, in particular the value of data protection for fundamental rights.
II. International Investment Law and the tension with public welfare
interests
The level of protection in investment law varies according to the legal basis or the
treaty. For the infringement of rights, it is less important which abstract right might
be affected but which concrete assurances were given via treaties by the states to
investors. Also, an application of an investment protection treaty requires an actual
investment in a host state. Accepting such an investment only because the Internet
can be accessed worldwide, at least theoretically, certainly leads too far.
Vishaka Ramesh lists in her article three rights which could be violated by data
protection regulations: The fair and equitable treatment principle (FET), the
prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory measures and the prohibition of unlawful
expropriation.
As blurred as the FET principle is, the manifold interpretation attempts have
in common that only legitimate expectations of an investor are protected. It is
questionable whether an investor can legitimately expect that its business, built
on the processing of personal data enjoying worldwide protection by human and
fundamental rights, will not be subject to regulation. In particular, the FET standard
does not protect against any type of regulation.
The prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment protects foreign investors
from being treated less favorably than nationals because of their nationality. This
principle plays only a minor role in the application of the International Investment
Law; it protects against worse — not against equal treatment.
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The concept of property in international law is very broad. Whether measures that
interfere with property rights are also indirect expropriations, depends on their
intensity. Property is not directly taken away by data protection regulations, these
rules are rather establishing a new regime for the handling of data. It is doubtful
whether they can demonstrate the intensity of indirect expropriations.
Furthermore, data protection rules can also be lawful if they qualify as expropriation.
They would be justified in the public interest and — in general — have to be
adequately compensated. But even if it is assumed that data protection rules violate
the rights of investors in individual cases, this does not necessarily result in an
obligation to pay compensation. More recent BITs (see e.g. Art. 16.2 EU-Japan
EPA, Art. 23.2 CETA), in particular, contain a right to regulate which may justify
interferences with the investors’ rights. Whether this will lead in the long run to a test
of proportionality, as popular as it may be among German experts in international
law, remains to be seen.
III. Data Protection in Public International Law
In consequence, not every state regulation that restricts the expectations of an
investor also violates their rights. For the evaluation of the proportionality of a
measure it is important to take into account its importance for the public interest.
Data Protection Laws are the consequence of the states’ obligation in International
Human Rights Law to protect and ensure the right to privacy of all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction [see inter alia Art. 17 ICCPR, Art. 8 ECHR,
Arts. 7 and 8 CFREU]. This duty is not only a negative obligation to refrain from
interfering with an individuals’ privacy, but also a positive obligation to implement
measures protecting this right against private interferences. In modern times, these
measures are Data Protection Laws. These do not, as the denomination might
suggest, protect data. Instead, they are protecting the individual human right to
privacy. Consequently, Data Protection Laws apply only while processing personal
data, not data in general. While the economic importance of (personal) data in a
digitalized world is increasing — “data is the new oil” —, so does the potential of
abuse. Big data analysis gives states, but also private entities, the possibility to
manipulate the life of individuals in an unprecedented, subtle way.
IV. Interferences in International Investment Law by Data Protection
Law: The GDPR
When accessing the legitimacy of a possible interference with the right to property of
digital enterprises, this extra-ordinary relevance of data protection must be taken into
account. Vishaka Ramesh points out that the principle of data localization violates
International Investment Law as it disproportionately affects foreign companies
and therefore constitutes an illegitimate discrimination. First of all, it should be
noted that International Investment Law aims above all at the equal treatment of
domestic and foreign investors. The requirement of data localization stipulates that
data must be stored within one country, regardless of whether it is a domestic or
foreign investor. Secondly, the principle of data localization — as implemented in
the GDPR — is not absolute. Art. 45 GDPR allows explicitly the transfer of personal
- 2 -
data to a third country (outside the EU) if the country ensures “an adequate level of
protection.” The elements which need to be taken into account by the Commission
while evaluating the question of adequacy — inter alia the rule of law, respect for
human rights, access of public authorities to personal data etc. — show that data
localization is not a method of promoting the local economy, but a safeguard to
ensure the protection of the human right to privacy. This is also highlighted by the
fact that the Commission already attested several States such an adequacy. Last
but not least, the implementation of the principle of data localization was not at all
unpredictable. Already the former EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 (a time
when neither Facebook nor Google existed) knew in its Art. 25 the necessity of an
adequate level of protection of personal data in third countries when transferring data
outside the EU.
Furthermore, it is doubtful if the legal implementation of the principle of data
minimization is even an interference with the right to property. In particular, data
minimization aims to stop storing data that is no longer needed or has never been
needed. Can such data about persons really be the property of another? Regarding
its future application it must be pointed out that digital enterprises of course do not
own the personal data of individuals which might have been given to them under
different legal circumstances at some point in the future.
Besides that, what goes for data localization is also true for data minimization:
Already the former EU Data Protection Directive made it in Art. 6 (1) lit. c clear that
personal data must not be “excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected” and even the GDPR with its very concrete wording of data minimization in
Art. 5 (1) lit. c was in force two years before it had to be applied (see Art. 99).
V. Result
Summarizing all the aforementioned, it might be true that Data Protection Law can
theoretically, if extra-ordinarily excessive, discriminatory and unforeseeable, violate
International Investment Law. In the very concrete case of the GDPR, it does surely
not. The principles challenged by Vishaka Ramesh are neither new nor excessive in
their impact on foreign investors. The truly big change of the GDPR, the possibility of
painful fines, is not a change of substantive law but supports only the enforceability
of a legal framework which exists in its basic structure since decades.
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